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 Interdisciplinary Deflections
 Histories of the Scientific Revolution in
 Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s Architecture   
 and the Crisis of Modern Science
 Stylianos Giamarelos
 Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL 
While disciplinary accounts of crisis 
tend to portray it as a strictly “inter-
nal” affair in the history of modern 
professions, in this article, I opt to 
treat moments of crisis precisely 
as occasions for vocational cracks 
into interdisciplinarity. Unbound 
by artificially imposed disciplinary 
boundaries, phenomena of crisis 
can therefore be understood in their 
increased complexity as varying 
manifestations of common historical 
shifts. By exposing the only rela-
tive autonomy of each disciplinary 
field, these moments of uncertainty 
thus blur their vulnerable boundar-
ies, opening up alternative lines 
of inquiry that in turn enrich our 
vocational understandings. Often 
instigating both reflection and 
inquiry, moments of crisis thus 
acquire both historical interest and 
theoretical implications for the 
present.
Those broader questions relat-
ing to the behavior of disciplinary 
boundaries in the context of crisis can 
be both historically and theoretically 
elucidated by revisiting one of the most 
recent moments of disciplinary crisis, 
instigated by the gradual rise of positiv-
ism, around the 1970s. At the moment 
when a new wave of positivism haunts 
contemporary architectural theories of 
parametricism, while other manifesta-
tions of crisis loom large (from the 
ecological to the epistemological plane), 
the act of revisiting Alberto Pérez-
Gómez’s 1983 Architecture and the Crisis 
of Modern Science as a historical case 
study is expected to lead to an essential 
reopening of lines of interdisciplinary 
inquiry for the present condition.
Architecture and the Crisis of 
Modern Science in the Historical 
Context of the Architectural Crisis  
of the 1970s
Architecture and the Crisis of Modern 
Science has certainly been a milestone 
in Pérez-Gómez’s academic career. 
For instance, it was largely thanks to 
its original publication in Spanish in 
1980, titled La genesis y superacion del 
funcionalismo en arquitectura (Genesis 
and overcoming of functionalism 
in architecture), that he became a 
fellow of the Mexican Academy of 
Architecture, an honor granted for 
his “outstanding contributions in 
the field of architectural theory.” 
Shortly afterward, the Society of 
Architectural Historians character-
ized the 1983 publication of the book 
in English as “the most distinguished 
work of scholarship in the history 
of architecture published in North 
America between Nov. 1, 1981 to Oct. 
31, 1983,” granting its author the 
Alice Davies Hitchcock Book Award. 
The wider disciplinary recognition 
implicit in these institutional asser-
tions may be better understood today 
when the book is situated within the 
Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s 1983 Architecture and the 
Crisis of Modern Science is used here as a vehicle for 
exploring the behavior of disciplinary boundaries 
in the context of crisis both historically and 
theoretically. Responding to his contemporaneous 
architectural crisis of the 1970s instigated by the rise 
of positivism, Pérez-Gómez uses Alexandre Koyré’s 
history of the scientific revolution as a mirror to 
reflect the historical developments of architectural 
theory upon it. Although effectively circumscribed, 
his deliberate exposure to an interdisciplinary 
history nonetheless contributes to the opening up 
of a much richer constellation of perspectives that 
illuminate the nature of the disciplinary crisis he 
was trying to negotiate. These in turn open up new 
lines of interdisciplinary inquiry for the present 
condition and the new wave of positivism that 
haunts contemporary theories of parametricism in a 
novel moment of crisis.
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historical context of its production. 
In the final instance, what came to 
be globally known as Architecture and 
the Crisis of Modern Science is a slightly 
reworked version of Pérez-Gómez’s 
1979 PhD dissertation, supervised 
by Joseph Rykwert (but also closely 
followed by Dalibor Vesely) at the 
University of Essex.
Completed right after the 
University of Essex MA program 
closed its decade-long historical 
circle (1968–78), the dissertation is 
essentially the culmination of their 
long-standing academic relationship, 
which has clearly shaped Pérez-Gómez 
as a scholar in architectural history and 
theory. Originally trained as an archi-
tect in Mexico (1971), Pérez-Gómez 
followed the MA program in the his-
tory and theory of architecture at the 
University of Essex just two years 
later (1973–74). A mere mention of the 
titles of his theses and dissertations 
provides sufficient indication of the 
subsequent focal shift in his interests: 
Pérez-Gómez moves from the broader 
“Concept of Space as an Essential 
Element in Architecture” (honors 
thesis, National Polytechnic Institute 
of Mexico, 1971) to “The Meaning of 
Geometry in Late 18th Century French 
Architecture” (MA thesis, University 
of Essex, 1975), and from there on to 
“The Use of Geometry and Number in 
Architectural Theory: From Symbols 
of Reconciliation to Instruments of 
Technological Domination” (PhD dis-
sertation, University of Essex, 1979). 
The prevailing concepts in all those 
alternative theses and book titles of a 
scholarly interest, which is essentially 
shaped and stabilized in the mid-1970s, 
in turn summarize the understanding 
of the contemporaneous disciplinary 
crisis offered by the University of Essex 
MA program: functionalism represents a 
crisis of meaning in architecture, whose 
roots lie in the use of geometry and 
number as instruments of technological 
domination. 
When Rykwert and Vesely set up 
the University of Essex MA program 
in 1968, they were in fact offering 
their own perspective on an emerging 
debate instigated by a new generation 
of British architectural theorists, crit-
ics, and historians. Irrespectively of their 
subsequently divergent approaches, 
Charles Jencks, George Baird, Geoffrey 
Broadbent, Kenneth Frampton, Alan 
Colquhoun, and Nathan Silvers (to name 
just a few) all shared a common ground 
when they acknowledged a deep-seated 
crisis in the discipline around the 1970s. 
Not only did they acknowledge a crisis 
of meaning in their contemporaneous 
architectural production (that could 
only be intensified by the accompanying 
discussions of systems analysis, cyber-
netics, and an architecture of the great 
number), but they were also at odds 
with the status quo of architectural his-
tory and theory, especially as the latter 
was by then taught in British schools 
of architecture. Opposing an increas-
ingly positivist technical education, 
an architectural theory that aspired to 
emulate the scientific method, and a 
linear understanding of architectural 
history as the progressive succession of 
monolithic styles, they advocated a self-
reflexive architectural theory instead. 
The essays collected in the 1969 anthol-
ogy, Meaning in Architecture (edited by 
Jencks and Baird),1 discursively including 
the comments of the authors on each 
other’s texts, serve here as a useful crys-
tallization of the debates of the period. 
This is precisely the broader context of 
British architectural discourse in which 
the University of Essex MA program is 
historically situated. But while Jencks, 
Baird, and Broadbent turned to lin-
guistics and semiology in their attempt 
to reclaim the architectural qualities 
that render a space “communicative,”2 
Rykwert and Vesely proposed a turn to 
history, phenomenology, and hermeneu-
tics instead (Figure 1).
Thus, in a period when techno-
logical optimism and instrumental 
rationalism dominated the field, the 
University of Essex MA program aimed 
to reinscribe architectural history and 
theory in the tradition of the humanities, 
and the debates around the multifarious 
legacy of the Enlightenment—as well as 
its discontents. Rykwert’s “Theoretical 
Literature of Architecture before 
1800” module proposed a close read-
ing of architectural theories “inevitably 
centre[d] on the Italian treatises of the 
XVIth and the XVIIth centuries, and 
the French literature of the XVIIIth,” 
as it moved forward in time toward 
the Enlightenment. It aimed to estab-
lish “a new relationship between the 
Ancients and the Moderns ... that ques-
tioned th[e] scientistic organization of 
knowledge.”3 Vesely’s “Phenomenology 
and Psychology of Perception; Their 
Implications for Methods of Design” 
module, on the other hand, explored 
issues of perception—especially in 
relation to memory, orientation, cor-
poreality, and culture. His proposed 
reading list was almost exclusively com-
prised of fundamental philosophical 
treatises of phenomenology and herme-
neutics, ranging from Edmund Husserl’s 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s 
Being and Time to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.4 
Vesely’s module was complemented by 
“The Individual Building and the Total 
Environment” and “The Nature of Style 
and Language in Architecture” semi-
nars, initially taught by George Baird, 
and later by Antoine Grumbach.5 In one 
of his later e-mail messages to Helen 
Thomas (April 7, 2003), Vesely explained 
Interdisciplinary Deflections
Figure 1. Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s Architecture and 
the Crisis of Modern Science in the crossroads of 
Dalibor Vesely’s phenomenological and Joseph 
Rykwert’s historically oriented teachings at the 
University of Essex MA Program, in the context of 
the wider 1970s debates for meaning and a self-
reflexive theory for architecture.
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that his seminars intended to explore 
the “situatedness of consciousness”—
especially in relation to “the role of the 
body, corporeal scheme and space (the 
move from Husserl to Merleau Ponty), 
and eventually interest in Heidegger 
and his notion of the structured world 
manifested in the most concrete form 
(manner) as situation.”6 
Even such a brief account of 
the seminars is enough to raise the 
question of a common ground or 
methodological consistency between 
Rykwert’s primarily historical interest 
in rereading European architectural 
treatises and Vesely’s philosophically 
motivated endeavors. Thomas sug-
gests that their meeting point was to be 
found “in their intention to develop an 
understanding of architecture within a 
deep cultural context that connected 
the past to the present.”7 Was that 
vaguely shared concern enough for 
their different approaches to cohere 
into, as it were, a distinctive ‘Essex 
School method’ of architectural history 
and theory, though?8 The different, 
and mainly personal, answers to this 
question can most effectively be pur-
sued in the work of their numerous 
disciples, from Robin Evans and David 
Leatherbarrow to Mohsen Mostafavi 
and Daniel Libeskind. For Pérez-
Gómez, in particular, “their approach 
worked very well together. Joseph 
went ‘forward’ from Vitruvius to the 
18th century, Dalibor ‘backward’ from 
phenomenology to the 19th century 
ending with Semper.”9 Following his 
lessons from Rykwert, Pérez-Gómez’s 
book also goes forward from Claude 
Perrault’s architectural treatises of the 
late seventeenth century to Gaspar 
Monge’s late eighteenth-century 
functionalization of geometry and 
Jean-Nicolas Louis Durand’s early 
nineteenth-century version of func-
tionalism in architecture; and, following 
his lessons from Vesely, his argument 
is hermeneutically informed by the 
present, that is, his contemporaneous 
concerns regarding the functionalist 
legacy of postwar modern architecture 
and the positivist reduction of archi-
tectural theory to a methodology of 
scientific building.
However, the actual intellectual 
trajectory followed by the young PhD 
student seems to have been far more 
nuanced than this linear and harmoni-
ous story implied by Pérez-Gómez’s 
retrospective account. This is at 
least attested by the difficulties he 
faced when submitting his disserta-
tion, a tension that was only resolved 
when Werner Oechslin was asked to 
intervene, and he did so to Pérez-
Gómez’s benefit, indeed. The account 
of this trajectory suggests that his 
1979 dissertation actually resembles a 
battleground, with the author anxiously 
struggling to find his own voice amidst 
the clashing strong influences of both 
his mentors. While Vesely’s hermeneu-
tic influence seems indisputable—with 
Neil Leach even alluding to Plato’s rela-
tion to Socrates when he asserts that 
Pérez-Gómez’s book “eloquently artic-
ulates the central thesis behind Vesely’s 
outlook”10—Rykwert’s, or, more 
broadly, the historically informed con-
tribution to Pérez-Gómez’s thesis, does 
not yet seem sufficiently highlighted.
It is precisely in this context that 
I propose an alternative reading of 
Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science 
that attempts to retrieve the peculiar 
role of history within it. Motivated by 
an interest in what this book, as a child 
of its own time, can possibly mean for 
the present concerns of the profession, 
I read Pérez-Gómez’s work as that of a 
scholar who attempts to work across a 
disciplinary border (from architecture 
to the history of science) precisely at 
the moment of a perceived disciplin-
ary crisis. Attempting to associate 
the peculiar rise of functionalism in 
architectural theory with the epochal 
changing worldview, initially trig-
gered by the seventeenth-century 
developments in science and natural 
philosophy, Pérez-Gómez aspires to 
no less than a total redefinition of our 
historical awareness of architectural 
modernity—which could in turn imply 
an overcoming of functionalism and 
its late twentieth-century discontents. 
My reading will focus on the way in 
which his architectural account may 
well reflect a broad historical map-
ping derived from the conclusions of 
contemporaneous historians of the 
scientific revolution, but it effectively 
retains Husserl’s phenomenological 
diagnosis of crisis as its main interpre-
tative undercurrent. 
Interdisciplinary Reflections: 
Alexandre Koyré’s History of  
the Scientific Revolution as a 
Blueprint for Pérez-Gómez’s 
Architectural Account
It is significant to start this peculiar 
retrieval of interdisciplinary history 
in Pérez-Gómez’s book by noting 
that references to studies in the his-
tory of science represent only 0.01% 
in the total sum of the book’s 698 
endnotes. With his 1983 English 
title clearly alluding to Husserl’s 
1936 Crisis of European Science and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, Pérez-
Gómez obviously insists on both the 
epistemological dimension and the 
phenomenological line of interpret-
ing the theoretical developments 
that lie at the heart of his book. 
Hence, his narrative is not merely 
dominated by the return of geometry 
at the forefront of human knowledge 
about the world. Equally important is 
its gradual emptying from any sym-
bolic or other metaphysical charge, 
as well as its concurrent conversion 
into a formal system that may well be 
internally consistent but is thence-
forth clearly distinct from the lived 
world of quotidian experience. More 
than anything else, it is precisely 
this dimension in his work that both 
documents his lessons from Vesely 
and reveals its methodological ori-
gins in the philosophical tradition of 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s herme-
neutics.11 In this specific context, 
the fact that Pérez-Gómez selects 
Alexandre Koyré’s work as his major 
reference from the historiography 
of the scientific revolution is hardly 
surprising.12 For his is not only 
an important work that shares an 
approach of the scientific revolution 
as an episode in the history of ideas, 
but its author was also mentored by 
Edmund Husserl. And while the cen-
tral figure for his study is probably 
Newton, Pérez-Gómez cannot stop 
referring to the “Galilean revolution” 
throughout his book—precisely 
Giamarelos
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because therein lies the most sys-
tematic origin of the geometrization 
of nature; and this is precisely what 
both Husserl (1936) and his disciple, 
Koyré (1939), also do when they place 
Galileo at the turning point of their 
own approaches to the history of 
modern science.13 
By effectively reflecting the 
conclusions of Husserl and Koyré 
in the domain of architecture, the 
main thread of Pérez-Gómez’s own 
hermeneutic historical narrative con-
sists of the gradual rationalization or 
“functionalization” of architectural 
theory. Already ascendant in the mid-
seventeenth century, these tendencies 
for a rationalized theory of architecture 
culminate in the early nineteenth-
century work of Jean-Nicolas-Louis 
Durand. Separated from wider cos-
mological or philosophical systems, at 
this point in time, architectural theory 
becomes a self-referential and inter-
nally consistent system governed by 
the laws of mathematics that acquires 
its meaning “internally” by this math-
ematical system itself. At the same 
time, this mathematical system lends 
architectural theory its epistemological 
legitimation, since it proves success-
ful in addressing the modern demands 
for a scientifically objective theory. In 
this epistemological context, any other 
external reference can only be consid-
ered inexorably subjective. Durand thus 
moves architecture away from art and 
closer to science. Therein lies the gap 
between “the eternal and immutable 
dimension of ideas [and] the finite 
and mutable dimension of everyday 
life.”14 It is the same gap that Alexandre 
Koyré’s mentor, Edmund Husserl, had 
already highlighted as characteristic of 
the crisis of modern science in 1936. 
By opposing the modern tendencies of 
identifying theory with a mere meth-
odology for technical and constructive 
efficiency, and a sum of general rules 
for any conceivable purpose (as 
opposed to a specific and meaningful 
teleology), Pérez-Gómez intends to 
foreground the significance of a histori-
cal horizon of meaning for architecture. 
The functionalization of architecture, 
the reduction of almost every aspect 
of it to a formal system of relations, 
whose value remains unchallenged, and 
the conversion of questions concern-
ing value and meaning into parameters 
that can functionally define form, are 
the main features of Pérez-Gómez’s 
perceived crisis in architectural theory, 
along the lines of Husserl’s diagnosis 
of the crisis of modern science. This is 
precisely the point where the history of 
the scientific revolution enters his own 
study, indeed: “modern architecture, 
and the crisis it faces, has its roots in 
a historical process touched off by the 
Galilean revolution.”15 This process 
involves the gradual foregrounding of 
number and geometry as fundamental 
factors in architectural theories of the 
period. Pérez-Gómez argues that this 
is the case indeed, since these are both 
factors that have been endowed with 
value and meaning by Newton’s natural 
philosophy, and its underlying Platonic 
cosmology that leads to a geometriza-
tion of nature16—as already argued by 
Koyré. 
According to Koyré, science is 
not a predominantly empirical process 
relying upon the mere accumulation of 
observational data, and the subsequent 
generalizations extrapolated from them 
through induction. Scientific novelty 
arises instead from a priori changes in 
the scientific spirit, which primarily 
take place in the field of metaphys-
ics (or philosophy). In science, the a 
priori element precedes the empirical; 
the latter is actually constructed and 
experimentally tested in response to 
the claims of a specific theory, and 
in the terms of its language.17 These 
presupposed a priori changes, which 
also render the scientific revolution as 
a rupture from the scientific practices 
of the ancient and the medieval world 
before it, are “the destruction of the 
Cosmos” and the “geometrization of 
space.”18 “Destruction of the Cosmos” 
stands for the gradual replacement 
of the ancient Greek world picture 
with that of a modern universe. The 
enclosed and hierarchically ordered 
whole of the ancient world, whose 
elements were driven to their natural 
place in the inferior terrestrial or the 
superior celestial sphere, is gradu-
ally replaced by a homogeneous open 
universe, in which there is no place for 
limits between ontologically different 
areas (topoi) and their accompanying 
teleology. This infinite universe is only 
bound by the common laws of nature 
that inexorably govern all its elements 
via forces of attraction and repul-
sion. “Geometrization of space,” on 
the other hand, stands for the crucial 
intellectual transition to an equally 
homogeneous Euclidean space, in 
which every position can be quanti-
tatively defined. This comes in sharp 
contrast to the Aristotelian conception 
of space (organized around the suc-
cession of qualitatively different topoi) 
that constituted the ancient world of 
quotidian experience. Hence, there is 
a direct link between these two major 
a priori changes, since the Euclidean 
conception of space also implies the 
abolishment of a deeply established 
hierarchical ontological (and, in the last 
instance, value-laden) distinction of the 
terrestrial from the celestial area. 
Pérez-Gómez repeatedly resorts 
to a common general interpretative 
schema for many of the architectural 
theorists that parade throughout his 
study. In almost every case, he usually 
foregrounds the internal tension devel-
oping between their positivist tendency 
toward an absolute formalization of 
architectural theory, in the image of 
contemporaneous developments in 
mathematics (and, especially, algebra 
and descriptive geometry), and their 
need for retaining a residue of symbolic 
meaning through an ultimate reference 
to an external element. This intellectual 
trajectory is in turn similar to the one 
followed by Koyré in his From the Closed 
World to the Infinite Universe (1957). There, 
the transition to the idea of an infinite 
universe is realized through the gradual 
magnification and subsequent explo-
sion of the bubble of the ancient world 
in the work of natural philosophers and 
protoscientists of the period.
Koyré’s work also allows Pérez-
Gómez to trace the crucial differences 
in the architectural debates between 
a mainly Newtonian Perrault and a 
mostly Galilean François Blondel.19 
According to Koyré, Newton’s pri-
mary focus lies on the mathematical 
description of reality through a series 
of experiments that will inductively 
Interdisciplinary Deflections
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lead to the suggestion of a theory. 
While such a theory cannot avoid 
including hypotheses as fundamen-
tal axioms (concerning the particle 
nature of light, for instance), these 
are legitimate and acceptable as long 
as they result or derive from the spe-
cific quantitative experimental data. 
Perrault’s intention to separate the 
conceptual dimension of number and 
architectural proportion on a level 
that is different from, and simultane-
ously underlies, our common everyday 
experience of buildings casts him as 
a Newtonian figure. Pérez-Gómez 
argues that the core of the Blondel-
Perrault debate lies in the possibility 
of relativizing the very values that 
used to bestow any architectural 
creation with meaning and aesthetic 
value. Inasmuch as he moves closer to 
the Platonic tradition of mathemat-
ics, Blondel is also closer to a Galilean 
figure: “Relying on the traditional 
belief that our perceptional world 
is a projection of the human body, 
Blondel maintained that geometry 
and proportion, being transcenden-
tal entities, guaranteed the highest 
architectural meaning, apart from 
the specificity of ornament or style.”20 
This is Blondel’s only way out of the 
relativization of architectural meaning 
that was incipient in Perrault’s work 
that came before him. In his work 
there is no space for a distinction 
between mere technical efficiency and 
empirical sufficiency from the abso-
lutely invariable cause and purpose 
of architecture. Hence, not only the 
book of nature but also the book of 
building is written in the language of 
geometry. 
Examples like these constantly 
recur in Pérez-Gómez’s account. 
His overview of the developments 
in architectural theory of the period 
consistently highlight a prevailing 
ambivalence regarding the status and 
nature of geometry and number, as 
well as their special contribution in 
establishing a desirable (e.g., cosmic) 
harmony. Obviously following Koyré’s 
interpretation again, he traces this 
ambivalence within Newton him-
self: “On the one hand, and on a 
practical level, Newton attested that 
geometry derives from mechanics; 
on the other hand, the geometrical 
order of his Platonic cosmology was 
a primordial symbol of God’s par-
ticipation in Being, confirming the 
significance of human action in an 
infinite universe.”21 In other words, 
Newton’s work, with its strong a priori 
assumptions, can still guarantee the 
ties that bind the world of science, 
which describes the reality of absolute 
movement in the language of math-
ematics, with the world of everyday 
experience and relative movements.22 
According to Pérez-Gómez, it is 
precisely these “external” metaphysi-
cal commitments of the Newtonian 
worldview that provide the ultimate 
horizon of meaning to Newton’s 
scientific practice. Hence, his math-
ematics of absolute space and time 
is not strictly formal in the positivist 
sense, since its legitimation derives 
from the absolute reality of a world 
where God is still present as the final 
guarantor of the validity, normality, 
and harmony of the natural laws.23 
Newton’s subtle metaphysical 
assumptions in turn exert an influ-
ence of their own in architectural 
theories of the period. As long as 
the Newtonian model prevails, the 
technical can coexist with the aes-
thetic dimension of architecture in 
the context of a whole that is not 
utterly self-referential.24 Pérez-Gómez 
contends that this is precisely the 
accomplishment of neoclassical 
architecture, which should not be 
conflated with a spirit of eclecticism 
between alternating formal styles 
and systems. And from that partial 
reinterpretation of a specific archi-
tectural style, he concludes with a 
broader redefinition of architectural 
modernity, claiming that “modern 
architecture did not appear around 
1750 and that it was not simply gener-
ated by the Industrial Revolution. The 
process of transformation of theory 
into an instrument of technological 
domination started with modern sci-
ence itself.”25 
To sum up Pérez-Gómez’s 
interdisciplinary foray into Koyré’s 
history of science, there are prob-
ably four main ways in which the 
scientific revolution exerts its influ-
ence on architectural theorists of the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. 
(a) Macroscopic epistemological 
influence: after the scientific 
revolution, architectural 
theories are developed 
within a totally different 
epistemological model that 
opposes traditional theo-
ries. Architectural theorists 
adopt the main thesis of 
Newton’s natural philoso-
phy as a strong conviction 
of their own. Assuming the 
definite existence of a math-
ematical law that correlates 
quantifiable (geometric) 
sums, their scientific task 
lies in discovering it through 
empirical research. In a 
similar fashion, they attempt 
to found the objectivity of 
architectural theory upon an 
invariable constant underly-
ing the superficial succession 
of historical styles and 
orders. 
(b) Microscopic epistemological 
influence: in this case, archi-
tectural theory production 
is understood as part of the 
wider cultural fermentations 
of the period. It is the spe-
cific work of distinct figures 
from the history of the sci-
entific revolution that exerts 
its influence upon architec-
tural theorists, thus leading 
them to different approaches 
and critical debates. The 
aforementioned example of 
the Perrault-Blondel as anal-
ogous to the Newton-Galileo 
debate is a characteristic 
case in point.
(c) Superfluous influence: in 
this case, the mere men-
tion of Newton’s name as 
an indubitable authority 
lends its gravitas to various 
assumptions of architectural 
theorists. See, for instance, 
Charles-Etienne Briseux, 
who used Newton’s name as 
a means of legitimizing his 
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own “insights” concerning 
nature, harmony, and the 
arts.26 
(d) Methodological influ-
ence: in this case, it is 
the experiment as a main 
feature of the modern sci-
entific practice that drives 
the appearance of proto-
experimental methods in 
architectural theory—mani-
fest in an increased emphasis 
on collecting empirical data. 
Marc-Antoine Laugier, who 
documented the existence of 
inherent and essential aes-
thetic qualities in architecture 
through a peculiar “experi-
mental” confirmation of his 
thesis (i.e., an empirical study 
of the impressions caused to 
himself and others by specific 
buildings) is a characteristic 
example here.27 Same goes for 
Nicola Carletti, who regarded 
architecture as a science that 
could use Newton’s analytical 
methods.28
Meanwhile, the pure geometrical 
volumes of the Platonic solids and 
the empty homogeneous spaces in 
the architecture of Étienne-Louis 
Boullée and Claude-Nicolas Ledoux 
attempt to render the absolute 
space and time of Newtonian natu-
ral philosophy a tangible everyday 
reality—reconciling human ends 
with an “external” Nature that is 
thenceforth regarded as independent 
from the human project. However, 
their conviction that the artistic and 
scientific dimensions of architecture 
are still reconcilable can only be fully 
accomplished in the perfect sphere 
of architectural drawing—and not 
through their imperfect realization 
in building.29 Thus, they unwit-
tingly contribute to a widening gap 
between theory and practice, which 
in turn is a rather unexpected con-
sequence of Koyré’s “destruction of 
the Cosmos.” 
Yet while Pérez-Gómez’s conclu-
sions certainly retain their validity for 
the field of architecture, they appear 
rather circumscribed when viewed 
from the perspective of histories of 
science. By constantly returning to 
the same concepts and interpreta-
tions derived mainly from Husserl, 
and often indirectly through Koyré, 
Pérez-Gómez circumscribes what ini-
tially seems like an opportunity for a 
variegated opening to interdisciplinary 
histories. Often acting as an intermedi-
ate, Koyré’s history of science can only 
serve as an alibi for an interdisciplin-
ary history of architecture, when in 
the final instance it practically echoes 
and reinforces Husserl’s dominant 
line of interpretation. That is to say, 
as an interdisciplinary history, Pérez-
Gómez’s account is in the final instance 
overtheorized, hence circumscribed. 
In other words, while Architecture and 
the Crisis of Modern Science revisits many 
of the architectural treatises discussed 
in the context of Rykwert’s seminar, 
it is indubitably Vesely’s teaching 
that prevails in Pérez-Gómez’s study, 
setting the phenomenological-herme-
neutical tone of interpretation of his 
historical material. In Husserl’s light, 
Pérez-Gómez’s study appears as a 
natural development of this particular 
phenomenological line of thought, 
through its reflective extension from 
the domain of science to that of archi-
tectural theory.
However, this process of reflection 
works as a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it provides Pérez-Gómez 
with strong conceptual and meth-
odological tools (from interpretative 
categories to a sense of orientation for 
his historical narrative) that allow him 
to understand the work of established 
figures in the field of architectural 
theory in the context of a broader 
cultural shift signaled by the scientific 
revolution.30 On the other, the a priori 
reflection of a ready-made interpreta-
tive framework hinders other possible 
interdisciplinary deflections, as it were, 
that remain latent in the multifarious 
historical accounts of the same period. 
Readily available to the author at the 
time of writing, and already widely 
debated during the late 1960s, those 
alternative perspectives on the histo-
riography of the scientific revolution 
can serve as a useful launchpad for 
further exploration of those possible 
interdisciplinary deflections. The added 
challenge to current understandings 
and the disciplinary boundaries they 
entail—alongside Pérez-Gómez’s 
significant, albeit predominantly philo-
sophical, opening to interdisciplinary 
Interdisciplinary Deflections
Figure 2. The 
illustrations of Georgius 
Agricola’s 1556 treatise 
on metallurgy, De re 
metallica (from left to 
right, 391, 72, and 181) 
are indicative of the 
impressive technical 
achievements of the 
practitioners of the 
period. According to 
Zilsel, key figures of the 
scientific revolution, 
like William Gilbert 
and Galileo Galilei, 
benefited greatly from 
their contact with this 
previously disregarded 
world of master 
craftsmen and artisans. 
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histories of the scientific revolution in 
architecture—opens up a constellation 
of possible historiographical perspec-
tives, which may also allow us to follow 
these threads of an epistemological 
crisis that still runs unbound up to the 
present moment. 
Interdisciplinary Deflections:  
Toward Other Histories of Science 
and Architecture
Effectively limited to the realm of 
a history of ideas, Pérez-Gómez’s 
study does not discuss the signifi-
cance of “external”/wider social and 
political developments in relation to 
the “internal”/intellectual develop-
ments during the long period of the 
scientific revolution. However, dif-
ferent social groups and their shifting 
relations, as well as those between 
wider political formations and insti-
tutions, inexorably play a crucial role 
in the propagation of the scientific 
revolution as a historical process.31 
This “external” history of science 
involves both the tensions associ-
ated with the reconciliation of the 
scientific with the religious world-
image and the specific attitudes 
encouraged by the prevailing spirits 
of Protestantism and Catholicism,32 
as well as the interactions between 
specific social groups that gradually 
shape scientific communities and 
their practices. The social dynamic 
that both supports and legitimates 
science as a novel mode of knowl-
edge production is therefore an 
equally significant part of a historical 
understanding of the scientific 
revolution.33 What are the possible 
implications of all this for novel archi-
tectural histories and theories of the 
period, though? 
In response to all of the above, 
Pérez-Gómez could of course follow 
Koyré in arguing that social forces 
cannot adequately explain exceptional 
figures like Newton. Even if one 
accepts this as a valid point, though, 
without contesting the very concept 
of the individual genius, it seems that 
it is precisely these social forces—and 
their complex interactions through 
politics—that explain both the deci-
sive acceptance of Newton’s work as a 
culturally dominant factor of modern 
life and the wider dissemination and 
social legitimation it enjoyed afterward. 
Or, in the words of Barry Barnes, and 
in a supposed absence of a sociological 
account of the history of science, the 
history of ideas alone cannot adequately 
explain itself.34 That is to say, it cannot 
explain the way in which those specific 
changes in the metaphysical assump-
tions of each period, which are indeed 
tirelessly diagnosed and mapped by his-
torians of ideas like Koyré, actually take 
place. If one would additionally con-
sider the fact that hardly ever are there 
conclusive arguments for or against any 
metaphysical thesis, it is rather obvi-
ous that the question concerning the 
dominance of certain assumptions on 
the scale of a whole epoch refers to a 
very complex phenomenon. It is clearly 
impossible to exhaust the latter in a 
process of completely disinterested and 
rational evaluation of the available argu-
ments for and against opposing views. 
Nonetheless, Barnes agrees that the 
scientific revolution can still be legiti-
mately approached as an episode in the 
history of ideas, precisely because this 
is still a period when the boundaries 
between philosophy and science have 
not been institutionalized, nor can they 
be retrospectively defined.35 
In that sense, Pérez-Gómez’s 
study retains its indubitable signifi-
cance as well. However, if one follows 
Barnes’s argument further into the 
field of architectural theory, then an 
intellectual history of architectural 
developments during the scientific 
revolution can only be a necessary first 
step toward a more comprehensive 
understanding. If the developments 
in the history of science since 1930 are 
anything to go by, indeed, then the 
latent potential of such architectural 
studies seems enormous. Pérez-
Gómez’s study might then anticipate its 
successors inasmuch as the fundamen-
tal transition from the “more-or-less” 
world of craftsmen to the quantifiable 
precision of the world of academics, 
retraced by Koyré, could only be read 
alongside a complementary sociological 
approach of the same phenomenon, 
like the one carried out by Edgar Zilsel, 
for instance.36 
In his equally influential historical 
studies, Zilsel intended to highlight 
characteristic social structures that 
could be associated with certain sys-
tems of knowledge and their modes 
of production. According to Zilsel, 
Giamarelos
Figure 3. Subsequent 
depictions of the 
figure of the architect 
gradually leaving 
behind the tools 
of manual labor 
and excelling in the 
theoretical knowledge 
of the orders and 
the proportions 
of harmony. The 
illustrations are in line 
with the agenda of the 
Parisian Academie 
d’Architecture (1671–
1717) that intended to 
move the architect 
away from the mess of 
the construction site.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 09
:40
 25
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
24
the main features that needed to be 
combined in order to produce the 
scientific method pertained to dif-
ferent social classes, whose special 
education enabled them to develop 
only a specific set of those skills. In 
other words, the boundaries that had 
to be overcome were not only intel-
lectual but also social. The scientific 
revolution was therefore possible only 
when the restructuring of social rela-
tions, due to the gradual shift from 
a feudal to a capitalist economy, led 
to a redefinition of previous class 
boundaries. It was this ongoing social 
process that initially created meet-
ing points and gradually facilitated 
the interaction between university 
scholars and humanistic literati (who 
were trained to methodically develop 
their abstract thinking, cultivating the 
intellectual skills necessary for ratio-
nal argumentation), on the one hand, 
and artisans (who excelled in empiri-
cal observations and devised original 
proto-experimental techniques, along 
with the instruments those required, 
but lacked a corresponding train-
ing in rationalist methodologies), on 
the other. There was a social barrier 
between the artisans, whose manual/
material contact with the world enabled 
them to empirically deduce rules of 
thumb for their practice, and the lite-
rati who could easily use those rules as 
initial steps for proceeding to abstract 
generalizations and inductions in the 
language of mathematics. However, this 
was not merely a matter of training but 
a matter of specific mental habits and 
attitudes as well. University scholars 
and humanistic literati held manual 
labor in such a low esteem that they 
could have never developed anything 
remotely like the experimental meth-
ods cultivated by the artisans. Thus, the 
social and intellectual osmosis that lies 
at the origins of the modern scientific 
method was indeed accompanied, and 
further facilitated, by an unprecedented 
cultural shift toward a reappreciation 
of the significant value of manual work. 
Thus, modern science is born precisely 
at the moment when a certain level 
of technological progress, combined 
with an overcoming of derogatory 
prejudices regarding manual work, 
allows the academic literati to adopt 
the artisans’ experimental methods and 
recuperate them within their rational-
ist ways of thinking. In their hands, 
the practical rules of the artisans can 
now be reformulated as laws of nature. 
According to Zilsel, this successful 
recuperation is characteristically exem-
plified in the cases of Galileo Galilei, 
Francis Bacon, and William Gilbert. In 
their major treatises, all three of them 
express their deep appreciation for, 
and refer extensively to, the remarkable 
empirical technological feats of their 
contemporaneous naval, metal, and 
military artisans and engineers (Figure 
2). Thus, these major figures in the 
history of science practically embody 
the bridging of a social gap, as in the 
case of Galileo and his lessons from the 
Venetian arsenali.37 
This social process is embedded 
within the progressive development 
of an early capitalist economy that 
weakens collective mentalities and 
discourages prejudice, while reinforc-
ing the secular, rational-causal way of 
thinking, along with a spirit of individu-
alism. According to Zilsel, the critical 
scientific spirit is directly associated 
with economic competition; that is 
precisely why it has never appeared 
within social formations that are not 
structured around it, that is, outside 
the Western European sphere of influ-
ence of the seventeenth century. The 
rise of quantification is also difficult 
to be disassociated from the rational 
calculus required by the members of 
capitalist economies. Even the revival 
of Greek mathematics was made pos-
sible by the increased needs of the new 
social organization for calculus and 
measurement. What gradually came to 
be known as the “Zilsel thesis” has even 
further historiographical implications, 
though. If the development of modern 
science coincides with the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism, indeed, 
then historical research needs to move 
away from Koyré’s conventional peri-
odization of the scientific revolution 
(from the publication of Copernicus’s 
De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium in 
1543 to Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica in 1687) to an 
altogether different time span, ranging 
from the end of the Middle Ages to the 
late sixteenth century. 
But Zilsel’s crucial historio-
graphical challenge is not limited to a 
question of an alternative periodiza-
tion that would shift the architectural 
historians’ attention to what has already 
been touted as the “first scientific revo-
lution” of the fourteenth-century late 
medieval world.38 Discussions about 
an alternative periodization could 
have already been instigated without 
veering off the realm of intellectual 
histories of science, indeed. In treat-
ing the scientific revolution in terms of 
continuity—instead of rupture—with 
the past advances of science, Pierre 
Duhem’s 1908 history of science had 
already inscribed the scientific prac-
tices of Galileo and Copernicus into a 
longer line of tradition that went back 
to the late Middle Ages.39 By studying 
the work of natural philosophers like 
Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme at the 
University of Paris, Duhem highlighted 
the reappearance and retainment of 
fourteenth-century concepts in seven-
teenth-century science, arguing for the 
medieval practitioners’ contribution 
to an understanding of fundamental 
concepts that still underlay the sub-
sequent mechanics later elaborated 
and further developed by the likes of 
Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. A 
turn to Duhem’s alternative timeline 
of developments is also corroborated 
in the case of architecture by the short 
time lapse between the constitution 
and identification of the community of 
architects before that of the scientists. 
Such an approach would then help the 
scholar in architectural history associate 
the developments in an early architec-
tural and an early scientific community, 
putting the architectural repercus-
sions of the scientific revolution into a 
long-term perspective.40 Last but not 
least, and inasmuch as Pérez-Gómez’s 
main concern still revolves around 
the dissemination of epistemological 
developments in natural science in 
other disciplines, his study could have 
also benefited from the later works of 
Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis (1950). Largely 
sharing Koyré’s view that the crucial 
shift during the scientific revolution lies 
in the processes of mathematization 
Interdisciplinary Deflections
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of the world picture, Dijksterhuis 
attempted to extend his research from 
physics in other domains, like chem-
istry and the life sciences.41 However, 
this was also the point where the 
limits of this interpretative schema 
appeared very clearly. Mathematics 
were not as important in the develop-
ment of other sciences, where Koyré’s 
and Dijksterhuis’s main thesis started 
to feel more like a straitjacket than a 
historically informed account. Could 
this also be the case for architectural 
developments of the period? Pérez-
Gómez’s strongly theorized historical 
account definitely didn’t leave room for 
exploring similar questions. Reflecting 
rather than deflecting Koyré’s account, 
Pérez-Gómez practically leaves it 
unchallenged, precisely at the moment 
when architecture could start acquiring 
its own peculiar sort of agency through 
an active contribution to (instead of 
a rather passive reflection of) the sci-
entific developments of the period. 
Offering a radical deflection, Zilsel’s 
crucial challenge pushes further in this 
direction. 
Inasmuch as architectural his-
torians are fascinated by intellectual 
histories of science, they tend to 
perceive the historical developments 
in the scientific domain as blueprints 
for the subsequent architectural ones. 
However, the gradual autonomy gained 
by a community of master craftsmen 
who start practicing architecture as a 
liberal art, and their contemporane-
ous distinct depictions as figures who 
thenceforth hold only a drawing, a 
ruler, and a compass, do indeed predate 
the constitution of the first scientific 
communities (Figure 3). If those his-
torical signs are anything to go by, then 
“external” social and political factors 
may well play an even more significant 
role in the developments in architec-
tural theory of the period—although 
the point in time when natural science 
adopts the cultural role of serving as 
a model for organizing and produc-
ing human knowledge still retains its 
indubitable significance. Yet, if Zilsel 
is right to assume that figures like 
Galileo and Gilbert benefit from their 
direct social contact with the classes of 
the craftsmen and the engineers who 
have already developed practical solu-
tions to difficult problems following 
their hands-on method of empirical 
experimentation, then the image of 
the intellectual historians of science is 
reversed: the architects and engineers 
of the period become the central focus 
of attention, with the scientific com-
munity following and learning from 
their achievements. Who are all those 
relatively anonymous figures of artisans 
and master craftsmen, and what are the 
crucial microhistorical shifts of their 
rising social status, as they gradually 
become autonomous professionals? It 
is the task of architectural historians 
to retrace these stories, and in doing 
so, they can inform our understanding 
of the scientific revolution, this time 
from the side of an active disciplinary 
contribution to it. In other words, and 
rather paradoxically so, the most useful 
interdisciplinary study for explor-
ing the historical relations between 
architecture and the natural sciences 
is the one that focuses on the specific 
achievements of the discipline itself as 
it is gradually shaped during the same 
period. Zilsel’s potential deflection 
in the historiography of architecture 
would allow historians of science to 
rethink the scientific revolution in 
a slightly different way, much closer 
to the logic of “the architecture of 
science.”42 What is gradually being 
sketched here is an approach where 
Pérez-Gómez’s study would unexpect-
edly end up meeting historiographical 
approaches of architecture like the 
ones propagated by Spiro Kostof, 
Mary Hollingsworth, and Elizabeth 
Mays Merrill on the microscale, and 
even by Manfredo Tafuri (1992) on the 
macroscale.43 It would also herald the 
moment when histories of science and 
architecture both need to open up to 
histories of technology of the same 
period,44 widening the interdisciplinary 
potential for further historiographical 
reflections and deflections of crisis. 
Novel interdisciplinary interpreta-
tions of architectural developments in a 
period that still needs to be historicized 
can only raise contemporary architects’ 
awareness of an epistemological crisis 
whose diverse repercussions still rock 
the cradle of our modern world. While 
interdisciplinarity allegedly prevails in 
many registers at the present moment, 
very often induced precisely by diagno-
ses of crisis, the sometimes cryptic and 
only nominal forms of interdisciplin-
arity upon which these diagnoses are 
built need to be as closely scrutinized 
and identified. At the moment when 
another dominant form of modern-
ist discourse, like parametricism, 
presents itself as the autonomous all-
inclusive universal metalanguage for the 
architecture of the future, the interdis-
ciplinary legacy of the “Essex School” 
of architectural history and theory 
needs to come out of its “historical 
cocoon” through a radical deflection.45 
If Patrik Schumacher’s “autopoietic” 
parametricism is only the most recent 
neopositivist child of the postmodern 
condition,46 then a novel breed of self-
reflexive architectural theory for the 
2010s needs to reopen such lines of 
interdisciplinary inquiry (Figure 4). 
Such an approach can considerably 
help both qualify the epistemological 
claims of parametricism and reveal 
the complex power issues, alongside 
the economic, political, social, and 
pedagogical agendas behind it. Since 
contemporary scholars have already 
started revisiting the work of early 
modern philosophers as a reply to the 
architectural challenges left unad-
dressed by parametricism,47 the need 
for a proliferation of such interdisci-
plinary deflections seems ever more 
relevant for the present moment, when 
similar examples of crisis unbound 
certainly abound. IT and its role in the 
production of knowledge was already 
there right from the start in 1979 in 
Jean-François Lyotard’s account of 
the postmodern condition, anyway. 
In other words, the most recent crisis 
of the modern world, the crisis from 
which Pérez-Gómez himself starts 
writing, is diagnosed to pertain once 
again to the epistemological plane of 
knowledge production, this time insti-
gated by the advent of IT.48 However, 
recent debates about the contribution 
of big data in contemporary knowl-
edge production hark back not only to 
Lyotard’s 1979 discussion but also much 
further back to Francis Bacon’s 1627 
New Atlantis and the constantly renewed 
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legacy of his thoroughly empiricist 
methodology of intensive data col-
lection. And if one follows a different 
thread from Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) 
and the accompanying vision of man’s 
domination of the natural world to 
the present, then the current ecologi-
cal crisis could also be illuminated in 
its historical and cultural depth—but 
also in its more recent social, political, 
and architectural dimensions, as they 
were developed by activists and artists 
of the 1960s and the 1970s, like Rachel 
Carlson and Agnes Denes.49 The list of 
similar examples could certainly go on 
and on, by first and foremost including 
the technocratically narrow concept of 
sustainability through reduced carbon 
emissions usually offered as a reply to a 
larger social, economic, and political set 
of questions regarding the ecological 
crisis. Biomimicry and other recently 
fashionable trends of computer-aided 
architectural design (that often refer 
exclusively to similar sources with 
much different “anti-Cartesian” 
conclusions)50 can also be similarly 
contextualized and reinterpreted in 
terms of their much longer cultural 
histories. However, the main point 
should be clear by now. By challenging 
both our temporal and our disciplinary 
parochialism, interdisciplinary histori-
ographies can certainly offer thoroughly 
incisive and insightful diagnoses of our 
contemporary manifestations of crisis. 
While it remains to be seen whether 
they can also inspire rigorous ways out 
of it, the latent potential for their 
development definitely remains the 
most significant legacy of Pérez-
Gómez’s and the Essex School 
method of architectural history and 
theory from the 1970s to the present, 
and from one instance of crisis to 
another.
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Notes
1 See Charles Jencks and George Baird, eds., 
Meaning in Architecture (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 
1969). Alan Colquhoun’s variant of a self-reflexive 
architectural theory is further explicated in his 
Essays in Architectural Criticism: Modern Architecture 
and Historical Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1981).
2 For a comprehensive discussion of this sort 
of linguistic turn in architectural theory and 
criticism of the period, see Andreas Kourkoulas, 
“Linguistics in Architectural Theory and 
Criticism after Modernism” (PhD diss., Bartlett 
School of Architecture UCL, 1986).
3 Helen Thomas, “Invention in the Shadow of 
History: Joseph Rykwert at the University of 
Essex,” Journal of Architectural Education 58, no. 2 
(2004): 39–45, 40.
4 Although Graham Livesey is right to note the 
“greater availability of phenomenological writings 
translated into English” in the 1980s and early 
1990s—see his “Changing Histories and Theories 
of Postmodern Architecture,” Building Research 
and Information 39, no. 1 (2011): 93–96, 95—some 
of the most important texts of this philosophi-
cal tradition were readily available in English in 
the 1970s, including Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 
trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press 1970), Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), Martin 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie 
and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell 1962), as well 
as his “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” trans. A. 
Hofstadter, in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1971), 143–161; and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method, trans. and ed. G. 
Barden and J. Cummin (New York: Seabury, 1975). 
5 For a more detailed account of Rykwert’s and 
Vesely’s University of Essex MA program (1968–
78), see Thomas, “Invention” (note 3). Joseph 
Bedford is currently focusing his in-progress PhD 
dissertation at Princeton University on the same 
MA program. 
6 Ibid., 45, note 21.
7 Ibid., 41.
8 While Thomas is right to highlight both the 
“deliberate intention toward practical applica-
tion” (ibid.) behind Vesely’s seminar and the 
“understanding of the design process” that was 
considered “integral to the approach to the aca-
demic material of the course” by Rykwert (ibid., 
42), she is also quick to subsequently ponder 
“whether the Essex master’s course unwittingly 
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